Here is some video from Day 1 of the Occupy WCB protest in Edmonton.
The organizers suggest that this is the start of a longer-term campaign and an interesting linkage of social movements (injured workers, occupy and the raging grannies).
So far, media coverage has been limited to radio coverage.
-- Bob Barnetson
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
Steps for Life Walk, Edmonton, May 5
Threads of Life is a not-for-profit that supports families affected by a workplace fatality, life-altering injury or occupational disease..
Steps for Life is the primary fundraising event for Threads of Life. This annual 5 km walk will beheld in Edmonton at Rundle Park on Saturday, May 5th. For more information on this Steps for Life walk, please contact Tanya Preece at tanya_24@hotmail.com or tanya@mhsa.ab.ca.
On May 1, 2011 more than 4,400 people in 37 communities across Canada walked together to support families affected by workplace tragedies. They walked together to raise awareness about the importance of workplace health and safety and that everyone should return home safe at the end of their work day. More than $333,900 was raised in cash donations.
-- Bob Barnetson
Steps for Life is the primary fundraising event for Threads of Life. This annual 5 km walk will beheld in Edmonton at Rundle Park on Saturday, May 5th. For more information on this Steps for Life walk, please contact Tanya Preece at tanya_24@hotmail.com or tanya@mhsa.ab.ca.
On May 1, 2011 more than 4,400 people in 37 communities across Canada walked together to support families affected by workplace tragedies. They walked together to raise awareness about the importance of workplace health and safety and that everyone should return home safe at the end of their work day. More than $333,900 was raised in cash donations.
-- Bob Barnetson
Working People in Alberta
I had the opportunity to attend the launch of Working People in Alberta: A History on Friday. This new book (available as a free download from Athabasca University Press) chronicles the history of Alberta workers and is useful in understanding the dynamics which are present in Alberta labour relations today. It is part of the 2012 project and draws upon material collected by the Alberta Labour History Institute.As I was surfing around, I also ran across an MA thesis by Jason Devine which traces the impact of the United Mine Workers of America, District 18 on the developing of workers’ compensation in Alberta. This thesis builds upon Devine’s earlier BA honours thesis on UMWA D18 and the One Big Union. .
-- Bob Barnetson
Tuesday, February 28, 2012
Injured worker protest tomorrow
It appears there will be a protest by injured workers across the street from the Edmonton Workers’ Compensation Building from February 29 to March 2. The Alberta Chapter of the Injured Workers of Canada have teamed up with Occupy Edmonton and the Raging Grannies to highlight what they perceive as flaws in the administration of the workers’ compensation system. You can read their demands on the link above. One of the questions they raise is:
This is an interesting question on a couple of levels. First, it links workers’ compensation denials to pressure on other (publicly funded) income support programs. That is to say, injuries that are denied by the WCB don’t simply go away. Rather, the costs associated are often borne by the health system, EI, CPP, welfare and AISH. To the degree that a refusal is illegitimate, this represents a cost transfer from employers to the taxpayer. An interesting research question would be how much of the provincial income support rolls comprise injured workers?
This line of questioning leads us to the issue of long-standing contentious WCB claims. One of the recommendations of the Doerkson review of workers’ compensation (way back in 2000) was that the province:
My sense of this is that there was, at that time, a desire to do something about these claims (which are both unjust and eat up a huge amount of MLA time). This recommendation may also reflect the widespread view during the early 2000s that the WCB did not administer claims fairly. The sawoff would be that costs associated with these files would then not be assessed against employers or industry groups.
The CEO of the WCB at the time was concerned that the costs would be borne by employers via premiums (basically there would be a cost transfer over time between firms). As a result, this recommendation went nowhere, although the government has, in the past, pointed to the greater independence given to the WCB appeals tribunal as the outcome.
If the key issue is money (and isn’t it always?), what might the government do if there was a pot of found money that was adequate to settle these claims? Well, it turns out there was. Last year, mostly through investment windfalls, the WCB ended up with $230.1 million more than it needed to be fully funded. Consistent with their policy, the WCB gave it back (as a special dividend) to employers
In fact, since 2006, the WCB has paid out $1.4 billion in special dividends. The government has argued that these represent overpaid premiums so should go back to employers. The 2011 special dividend was not an overpayment though—it was driven largely by investment windfalls.
So why not use that money to resolve these long-standing claims? It might have taken some effort by the government, but surely that is not impossible. What is more likely is that there is simply no political appetite to address long-standing claims. And this, as much as anything, explains the continuing anger and action of injured workers.
-- Bob Barnetson
Where is the WCB money that is paid into by employers?
Why are Alberta Taxpayers paying for Injured Workers who have been denied legitimate WCB claims and forced onto AISH, a taxpayer funded social program? WCB cannot displace Injured Worker to AISH leaving Alberta Taxpayers to foot the bills.
This is an interesting question on a couple of levels. First, it links workers’ compensation denials to pressure on other (publicly funded) income support programs. That is to say, injuries that are denied by the WCB don’t simply go away. Rather, the costs associated are often borne by the health system, EI, CPP, welfare and AISH. To the degree that a refusal is illegitimate, this represents a cost transfer from employers to the taxpayer. An interesting research question would be how much of the provincial income support rolls comprise injured workers?
This line of questioning leads us to the issue of long-standing contentious WCB claims. One of the recommendations of the Doerkson review of workers’ compensation (way back in 2000) was that the province:
Establish a one time independent tribunal with the authority to arbitrate and resolve, through settlement, long standing contentious claims.
My sense of this is that there was, at that time, a desire to do something about these claims (which are both unjust and eat up a huge amount of MLA time). This recommendation may also reflect the widespread view during the early 2000s that the WCB did not administer claims fairly. The sawoff would be that costs associated with these files would then not be assessed against employers or industry groups.
The CEO of the WCB at the time was concerned that the costs would be borne by employers via premiums (basically there would be a cost transfer over time between firms). As a result, this recommendation went nowhere, although the government has, in the past, pointed to the greater independence given to the WCB appeals tribunal as the outcome.
If the key issue is money (and isn’t it always?), what might the government do if there was a pot of found money that was adequate to settle these claims? Well, it turns out there was. Last year, mostly through investment windfalls, the WCB ended up with $230.1 million more than it needed to be fully funded. Consistent with their policy, the WCB gave it back (as a special dividend) to employers
In fact, since 2006, the WCB has paid out $1.4 billion in special dividends. The government has argued that these represent overpaid premiums so should go back to employers. The 2011 special dividend was not an overpayment though—it was driven largely by investment windfalls.
So why not use that money to resolve these long-standing claims? It might have taken some effort by the government, but surely that is not impossible. What is more likely is that there is simply no political appetite to address long-standing claims. And this, as much as anything, explains the continuing anger and action of injured workers.
-- Bob Barnetson
Monday, February 27, 2012
OHS charges: why the delay?
I was looking through the government's website on OHS prosecutions for a book chapter I'm writing. One of the things I noticed in the section outlining pending OHS charges are the gap between an offense and being charged.
Without exception, the province does not file charges until two years after the date of incident. If I recall correctly, the OHS Act has a two-year limitations clause. This systematic delay in charging employers may reflect the complexities of the investigation and/or under-resourcing at some point in the investigation or prosecution stages.
Part of the purpose of charging an employer under the OHS Act is to make an example of the employer in the hopes of encouraging other employers to obey the law. This two-year lag seems to undermine this effect--the link between the event, being charged and being convicted is long and tenuous. In fact, completing a prosecution takes an average of 3-4 years.
This suggests a system of ticketing might be a useful interim step. Former Minister of Employment and Immigration Thomas Lukaszuk indicated legislation (i.e., a regulation) allowing this was being drafted back in September. The status of this initiative is unclear, given there is a new minister and nothing has been heard about ticketing in some time.
-- Bob Barnetson
Without exception, the province does not file charges until two years after the date of incident. If I recall correctly, the OHS Act has a two-year limitations clause. This systematic delay in charging employers may reflect the complexities of the investigation and/or under-resourcing at some point in the investigation or prosecution stages.
Part of the purpose of charging an employer under the OHS Act is to make an example of the employer in the hopes of encouraging other employers to obey the law. This two-year lag seems to undermine this effect--the link between the event, being charged and being convicted is long and tenuous. In fact, completing a prosecution takes an average of 3-4 years.
This suggests a system of ticketing might be a useful interim step. Former Minister of Employment and Immigration Thomas Lukaszuk indicated legislation (i.e., a regulation) allowing this was being drafted back in September. The status of this initiative is unclear, given there is a new minister and nothing has been heard about ticketing in some time.
-- Bob Barnetson
Friday, February 24, 2012
How will the government respond to a teacher strike?
With teacher bargaining stalled out, I’ve had a couple of queries about the possibility of a province-wide teacher strike when the Alberta Teachers Association (ATA) contracts expire in August. I think we are some distance from any strike (late autumn or early winter would be my guess) and there is lots of opportunity for a negotiated solution.
But an interesting question is what can and will the government do in the face of a strike or lockout in the K-12 system? I assume there will be lots of public hand wringing (“think of the children!”) even though there is basically zero evidence that even prolonged teacher strikes have any educational impact upon students.
But a strike does create a political emergency because many families rely upon schooling for child care. Closing schools quickly becomes disruptive for families and employers. We saw this public pressure play roles in the 2002 (nearly) province-wide strike and the 2007 Parkland County School District strike. So what can the government do?
Well, assuming the government does not broker a deal with some cash, the government’s first option is to delay the strikes and lockouts by imposing Dispute Inquiry Boards (DIBs) under the Labour Relations Code. A DIB gives a mediator 20 days (or more) to see if a deal can be crafted. If not, the DIB report is put before the parties for a vote. DIBs imposed after the strike or lockout has started do NOT suspend the strike or lockout.
The major downside of using DIBs for the government is that, if the parties accept the DIB report, the government will be under pressure to fund the costs associated with the deal because the government imposed the DIB on the dispute. The parties may, in fact, quietly collude to put the government on the hook this way if the DIB report is half reasonable.
The government could also appoint a high profile mediator to try and settle the dispute. Such a voluntary process gives the parties an opportunity to resolve the disputes while saving face. But one or both sides may see an ongoing strike as a useful tool to loosen provincial purse strings. And they may just be too pissed off at each other to consider mediation so this may be a non-starter.
More importantly, parents may see voluntary mediation as an ineffective response by the government. My own experience answering phones for the government during the Parkland dispute is that parents wanted the strike resolved “right bloody now!” (although most supported the teachers). And my impression was that MLAs were pretty worried about the flack they were getting from constituents for not acting decisively.
Moving on, then, the Labour Relations Code allows the government declare the strikes/lockouts constitute public emergencies, end the work stoppages and impose Public Emergency Tribunals (PETs) to sort out the new contract. The government did this in 2002 and got slapped around by the courts pretty badly because it failed to prove there was an emergency that health or property or caused undue hardship. In 2007, the government shied away from this option, in part because it had no capacity to prove undue hardship and little appetite to repeat Lyle Oberg’s public relations mess of 2002.
The government could also pass back-to-work legislation (as it did in 2002) ending the strike and setting out a dispute resolution process and/or set the terms of the dispute. This will be justified as “protecting the interests of students” but might well face a Charter challenge given the recent SCC ruling that the right to strike is protected under s.2(d) as well as by international law. The question will be whether the state can meet the three-part test to demonstrate that back-to-work legislation was a reasonable infringement on worker rights.
The major risk of back-to-work legislation is that a successful appeal could give rise to more case-law that expands the Charter rights of workers and increases the pressure on the government to align Alberta’s employment laws with Canada’s international treaty obligations. The government of Alberta has historically opposed both of these outcomes (those pesky human rights we agreed to…).
Finally, the government could do nothing. This is politically risky as pressure to act will mount as parents are increasingly inconvenienced. And it gives the Wild Rose (which favours taking away teachers’ right to strike) an issue to crow about. Yet there is an upside: the parties are left to sort out the matter and negotiate an agreement that is workable for both sides. Imposed agreements can result in settlements that are difficult to implement and leave long-standing issues to continue to fester. This simply sets the stage for another dispute a few years down the road.
Anyhow, an interesting set of policy choices for the government in the months ahead. Of course, it could just adequately fund the education system and avoid this issue entirely… .
-- Bob Barnetson
But an interesting question is what can and will the government do in the face of a strike or lockout in the K-12 system? I assume there will be lots of public hand wringing (“think of the children!”) even though there is basically zero evidence that even prolonged teacher strikes have any educational impact upon students.
But a strike does create a political emergency because many families rely upon schooling for child care. Closing schools quickly becomes disruptive for families and employers. We saw this public pressure play roles in the 2002 (nearly) province-wide strike and the 2007 Parkland County School District strike. So what can the government do?
Well, assuming the government does not broker a deal with some cash, the government’s first option is to delay the strikes and lockouts by imposing Dispute Inquiry Boards (DIBs) under the Labour Relations Code. A DIB gives a mediator 20 days (or more) to see if a deal can be crafted. If not, the DIB report is put before the parties for a vote. DIBs imposed after the strike or lockout has started do NOT suspend the strike or lockout.
The major downside of using DIBs for the government is that, if the parties accept the DIB report, the government will be under pressure to fund the costs associated with the deal because the government imposed the DIB on the dispute. The parties may, in fact, quietly collude to put the government on the hook this way if the DIB report is half reasonable.
The government could also appoint a high profile mediator to try and settle the dispute. Such a voluntary process gives the parties an opportunity to resolve the disputes while saving face. But one or both sides may see an ongoing strike as a useful tool to loosen provincial purse strings. And they may just be too pissed off at each other to consider mediation so this may be a non-starter.
More importantly, parents may see voluntary mediation as an ineffective response by the government. My own experience answering phones for the government during the Parkland dispute is that parents wanted the strike resolved “right bloody now!” (although most supported the teachers). And my impression was that MLAs were pretty worried about the flack they were getting from constituents for not acting decisively.
Moving on, then, the Labour Relations Code allows the government declare the strikes/lockouts constitute public emergencies, end the work stoppages and impose Public Emergency Tribunals (PETs) to sort out the new contract. The government did this in 2002 and got slapped around by the courts pretty badly because it failed to prove there was an emergency that health or property or caused undue hardship. In 2007, the government shied away from this option, in part because it had no capacity to prove undue hardship and little appetite to repeat Lyle Oberg’s public relations mess of 2002.
The government could also pass back-to-work legislation (as it did in 2002) ending the strike and setting out a dispute resolution process and/or set the terms of the dispute. This will be justified as “protecting the interests of students” but might well face a Charter challenge given the recent SCC ruling that the right to strike is protected under s.2(d) as well as by international law. The question will be whether the state can meet the three-part test to demonstrate that back-to-work legislation was a reasonable infringement on worker rights.
The major risk of back-to-work legislation is that a successful appeal could give rise to more case-law that expands the Charter rights of workers and increases the pressure on the government to align Alberta’s employment laws with Canada’s international treaty obligations. The government of Alberta has historically opposed both of these outcomes (those pesky human rights we agreed to…).
Finally, the government could do nothing. This is politically risky as pressure to act will mount as parents are increasingly inconvenienced. And it gives the Wild Rose (which favours taking away teachers’ right to strike) an issue to crow about. Yet there is an upside: the parties are left to sort out the matter and negotiate an agreement that is workable for both sides. Imposed agreements can result in settlements that are difficult to implement and leave long-standing issues to continue to fester. This simply sets the stage for another dispute a few years down the road.
Anyhow, an interesting set of policy choices for the government in the months ahead. Of course, it could just adequately fund the education system and avoid this issue entirely… .
-- Bob Barnetson
Friday, February 17, 2012
AUPE strike wraps up quickly
Yesterday’s wildcat strike by AUPE support staff workers at roughly 20 facilities ended quickly last night. Details are a bit vague on the settlement but it sounds like the dispute will head to binding arbitration and the employer will not pursue retribution against individual strikers or AUPE. You can hear my CBC interview here.
AUPE is sticking to its story that this was a spontaneous action by workers and that it was caught unawares.
That certainly could be true. Yet a number of folks I’ve talked to are skeptical of claims that no one at the AUPE mothership knew what was going on.
Consider these facts. The strike occurred on the day that AUPE had organized information pickets (basically creating circumstances that could lead to a wildcat strike). The strike spread rapidly to 20 facilities (although social media could explain the speed of the spread). And AUPE was able to quickly get all workers back on the job (a true wildcat is often much more difficult for a union to control).
It certainly looks a bit too organized to be a true wildcat where the membership goes out of control. AUPE has multiple interests in maintaining this story. First, a wildcat strike (where individuals got pissed off and walked out) is a much more sympathetic storyline than the union organizing a strike.
Second, a wildcat suggests that the union didn’t do anything wrong, perhaps delaying the impositions of sanctions. When AUPE organized an illegal strike in 2000, it ended up with a $200,000 fine, a two-month dues suspension, and a pile of legal bills.
Third, a wildcat allows the union to argue it needs some movement from the employer in order to get the workers back to work. What precisely AUPE got in this deal is hard to say. The press coverage framed (or revealed) AHS as jerks at the bargaining table. One of the AUPE ads that was up briefly online yesterday (and has now disappeared) was a surgical processor (someone who sterilizes instruments) talking about her wages ($22/hour) versus the $267/hr the 61(ish) AHS vice-presidents make. Zing!
It showed AHS (and other employers) that AUPE isn’t to be screwed with. It also amped up the pressure on the government to loosen the purse strings. And give workers and opportunity to vent some of their frustration—knowing their managers were doing their jobs while they walked the line on a sunny winter days.
We’ll likely never know what the real story is. But we do know that the strike was reasonably effective. Perhaps other unions will take note?
-- Bob Barnetson
AUPE is sticking to its story that this was a spontaneous action by workers and that it was caught unawares.
That certainly could be true. Yet a number of folks I’ve talked to are skeptical of claims that no one at the AUPE mothership knew what was going on.
Consider these facts. The strike occurred on the day that AUPE had organized information pickets (basically creating circumstances that could lead to a wildcat strike). The strike spread rapidly to 20 facilities (although social media could explain the speed of the spread). And AUPE was able to quickly get all workers back on the job (a true wildcat is often much more difficult for a union to control).
It certainly looks a bit too organized to be a true wildcat where the membership goes out of control. AUPE has multiple interests in maintaining this story. First, a wildcat strike (where individuals got pissed off and walked out) is a much more sympathetic storyline than the union organizing a strike.
Second, a wildcat suggests that the union didn’t do anything wrong, perhaps delaying the impositions of sanctions. When AUPE organized an illegal strike in 2000, it ended up with a $200,000 fine, a two-month dues suspension, and a pile of legal bills.
Third, a wildcat allows the union to argue it needs some movement from the employer in order to get the workers back to work. What precisely AUPE got in this deal is hard to say. The press coverage framed (or revealed) AHS as jerks at the bargaining table. One of the AUPE ads that was up briefly online yesterday (and has now disappeared) was a surgical processor (someone who sterilizes instruments) talking about her wages ($22/hour) versus the $267/hr the 61(ish) AHS vice-presidents make. Zing!
It showed AHS (and other employers) that AUPE isn’t to be screwed with. It also amped up the pressure on the government to loosen the purse strings. And give workers and opportunity to vent some of their frustration—knowing their managers were doing their jobs while they walked the line on a sunny winter days.
We’ll likely never know what the real story is. But we do know that the strike was reasonably effective. Perhaps other unions will take note?
-- Bob Barnetson
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