Book: Modern Whore: A Memoir

The public library came through last week with a copy of Modern Whore: A Memoir. This 2022 autobiography by Andrea Werhun recounts her career as an escort, exotic dancer, online performer, and a sex-worker advocate in Canada. 

Sex work often brings to mind images of outdoor work. Werhun’s stories offer insight into indoor sex work (which comprises most sex work). Werhun began as an escort working for an agency. Her stories explain, sometimes incidentally, how agencies work and the services they offer sex workers (e.g., screening, scheduling, payment, transportation, security), most of which run afoul of Canada’s present sex-work laws.

An interesting aspect is Werhun’s analysis of how online reviews, which are essential to getting work, give clients a mechanism by which to pressure sex worker to engage in behaviour they otherwise might decline. Werhun also helpfully posts a few of her reviews and then provides her own (presumably more accurate) recollections of those encounters to highlight the discrepancies.

After a break, Werhun returned to sex work as an exotic dancer. Again, she explains (often incidentally) how dancing works, what services the club provides, and the working conditions of dancers. Her stories help explain how these arrangements affect the workers, including what behaviours they permit and incentivize.

Finally, Werhun discusses how Covid-19 affected sex workers and her own efforts to shift to online work in the spring of 2020. This section is the least developed (since it was still ongoing at the time of publication) but highlights how individual circumstances and factors shaped the options available to sex workers during the initial stages of the pandemic.

Throughout the book, Werhun discusses in some depth how sex work (and the stigma surrounding it) affected her, including her relationships and her physical and mental health. She also presents an interest picture of the clients she saw, their motives for hiring sex workers, and their behaviours.

Overall, Modern Whore is well written and engaging andf would be of interest to students in LBST 415. It offers a useful look into contemporary indoor sex work in Canada as experienced by a well educated, white, cis woman from a middle-class background.

-- Bob Barnetson 

Disaster responses, OHS and COVID

One of many tasks of OHS practitioners is to plan organizational responses to disasters. The most common kind of workplace disaster we develop plans for are building fires. In fact, the laws passed in the wake of the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire are some of the earliest forms of OHS regulation.

In planning a response to a fire (hint: get out), it can be useful to know how people respond to rapidly evolving, high-stress, low-frequency events and why they respond that way. Last week, I ran across a 2004 article entitled “Why people freeze in an emergency: Temporal and cognitive constrains on survival responses”

Basically, the author looked at the literature, examined disaster inquiry reports, and interviewed a bunch of disaster survivors to verify the existence of freezing behaviour in disasters and quantify it. He concluded:

Responses to unfolding disaster can be divided broadly into three groups.

In the first group, between 10‐15% of people will remain relatively calm. They will be able to collect their thoughts quickly, their awareness of the situation will be intact, and their judgment and reasoning abilities will remain relatively unimpaired. They will be able to assess the situation, make a plan, and act on it.

The second group, comprising approximately 75% of the population, will be stunned and bewildered, showing impaired reasoning and sluggish thinking. They will behave in a reflexive, almost automatic manner.

The third group, comprising 10‐15% of the population, will tend to show a high degree of counterproductive behavior adding to their danger, such as uncontrolled weeping, confusion, screaming, and paralyzing anxiety (Leach, 2004).

This finding is important because, generally speaking, the mechanisms we create to allow people to protect or save themselves in such situations requires them to take immediate and sensible action (e.g., use fire exits, put in a life vest, open an emergency exit on a plane). If only 10-15% of people can be relied upon to do so, then these mechanisms likely won’t achieve their desired result (i.e., nobody dies).

The author attempts to explain maladaptive emergency behaviour by conjecturing that sub-optimal responses are related to our brains’ information-processing limitations. He asserts that, when faced with a novel event, our brain requires time to assess it, develop a plan, and execute it.

Disasters, which are novel and complex and involve significant stress, often unfold too quickly for us to meaningfully react. However, he says, since your brain can select among a pre-existing behaviours much faster than it can design new behaviours, training on how to respond can attenuate this effect. (This is why we do fire drills and why you get a safety briefing before every time a plane takes off.)

The explanation advanced by this article has intuitive appeal (i.e., it sounds plausible on first blush), but the question is whether the explanation is correct. Recall that the conclusion (i.e., brain too slow) is conjecture, rather than the results of any empirical testing. I spent some time looking for evidence that this conjecture was correct and didn’t find much (although this isn’t my field and maybe I looked in the wrong places; I also ran into a bunch of paywalls that I could not get past).

What I found was:

• An article entitled Executive Dysfunction in a Survival Environment (2010) saw the author explore in more detail which aspects of executive functioning were impaired by novel and stressful conditions. It finds some support for the conjecture.
• An paper entitled Startle, Freeze and Denial: An analysis of Pathological Pilot Reactions during Unexpected Events (2012) explored multiple potential explanations for maladaptive behaviour, suggesting more complex dynamics. 

So maybe there is something to the original author’s explanation for this well documented phenomenon but YMMV. An important barrier to proving it is simulating the necessary degree of stress in an experiment.

The reason this article came up in my feed (I think on Bluesky but maybe Twitter) is that someone was likening the three-group typology to explain people’s reactions to Covid. Basically the asserted that the calm, muddled, and counterproductive groups in the 2004 disaster study are analogous to active avoiders, passive avoiders, and minimizers.

This analogy was intuitively appealing, bolstered by the seeming authority of the original study. It is useful, though, to deliberate a bit about whether the disasters that the original article looked at (e.g., a ferry sinking or a plane catching fire) is similar enough to Covid for conjectured explanation to apply. A key difference that jumps almost immediately to mind is the time scale.

Contemporary Covid behaviours are the result of a lengthy process. While Covid is a novel event, the time-scale is not the same as the disasters that the original author explored (where the speed of the disaster may have outpaced decision making).

So, while the proportion of active avoiders, passive avoiders, and minimizers may (or may not) mirror the groupings in the disaster study, the similarities between disasters and Covid are likely superficial and coincidental. Thus, we ought not put much stock in the claim that the 2004 study is in any was applicable or instructive to understanding Covid responses.

-- Bob Barnetson

Alberta Labour 2023 Annual Report

Alberta has released its 2023 annual report for the part of the government that was at one time called Labour and that relate to Albertans being safe and treated fairly in the workplace.

Fairness at Work Declines

The number of employment standards complaints filed were up by about a third in 2022/23. Complaints tend to reflect a fraction of overall violations; most workers don’t bother reporting things like wage theft.



This is an interesting reversal of a long-term decline in employment standards complaints.



Notably, the time to begin an investigation tripled and the time to resolve a complaint doubled. This has long been a bugbear in the employment standards system. The report asserts this reflects increasing volume and complexity.

The number of complaints investigated with signs of human trafficking jumped from 102 in 2021/22 to 208 in 20223/23.

The number of administrative penalties issued to employers dropped from 3 in 2021/22 to zero in 2022/23.

Safety: Losing the Will to Enforce

Worksite inspections plus re-inspections totalled 13,717 in 2023/23, down 12% from 15,569 in 2021/22. If you look later in the report for some context, this is about 6% fewer inspections/re-inspections than in 2018/19 (14,590), which was the last full year when the NDs were in power. At this rate, the inspection cycle is theoretically about once every 15 years (give or take).



About 80% of inspections were the results of complaints while the remaining 20% were targeting industries with safety problems. There were 1207 proactive inspections in 2022/23 resulting in 1725 orders issued. This is down from 2021/22, with 2100 inspections and 2548 orders. I couldn't find any historical data in this to provide context.

The number of investigations (e.g., of injuries) dropped by 60%, from 2245 in 2018/19 to 888 in 2022/23.

Orders written were up slightly over 2021/22 to 9099. This may be good (more enforcement) or may be bad (more violations occuring)—hard to say. If you look at 2018/19, there were 16,680 orders issued.

Ticketing of violators was down. There were 27 tickets with a total value of $11,280 issued in 2022/23. This is slightly fewer than in 2021/22 (32 tickets, $11,500). This reporting leaves out important context. If you look at 2018/19, there were 479 tickets issued.

Administrative penalties were also down. There were 17 penalties worth $62,025 issued in 2022/23. This is notably fewer than in 2021/22 (37, $314,250).

Convictions were also down, with 2022/23 seeing $1,740,750 in fines assessed. This is down from $1,919,000 in 2021/22. There was no reporting of the number of convictions but a hand count suggests the number is stable the last few years at around (hand-waggle) 10 per year, down from more than 20 in 2018/19.

Injury Rates are Up: Yeah, it’s mostly COVID.

The lost-time claim rate rose for at least the seventh straight year. Much, but not all, of this increase is due to COVID-19 injuries.



The disabling injury rate (lost-time plus modified work) is also up. Again, much but not all of the increase is due to COVID injuries.



The absence of meaningful government protocols related to aerosol spread put responsibility for these COVID-related increases squarely on the shoulders of government.

Interestingly, the absolute number of accepted fatalities is down to 120 (from 136). There is no real analysis of that change. It could be the result of changes in the workforce composition. It could also just be random variation (small numbers tends to be swingy).

Analysis

Overall, it looks like the government continues to lose the will and/or capacity to meaningfully enforce workplace safety rules under the UCP. Not surprisingly, the rate of injury has risen, likely because workplaces are more dangerous.

There has also been an uptick in complaints about employment standards (basically wage theft). This could be caused by more workers knowing to and being willing to come forward. I’d guess, though, that this reflects employers knowing it is open-season on workers under the UCP and, thus, stealing wages more frequently.

-- Bob Barnetson

Climate change and safety: treeplanters and wildfire smoke

A few weeks back, the Tyee ran a story on the effect of increasing levels of wildfire smoke on tree planter OHS. This story is interesting because it looks at the effect of climate change on worker safety.

There are several reasons why this particular hazard and worker group are worth examining:

• Intensity of exposure: Tree planters often work in close proximity to wildfires and their work is physically demanding (increasing respiration and heart rate). Consequently, they are likely to have one of the highest intensities of exposure to wildfire smoke.
• Duration of exposure: In addition to long working days, most tree planters live in camps (e.g., tents) and lack any respite from the smoke in their off hours. This means these workers have a much longer duration of exposure than, say, a worker who might face dust in the workplace but then go home to clean air at the end of the day.
• Lack of specific controls or OELs: There are no specific occupational exposure limits (OELs) for wildfire smoke and general OELs for dust were not designed with wildfire smoke (which has very tiny particles) in mind.
• Latency: Injuries due to inhalation often have long latency periods and murky causality, thus the link between the work exposure and the ill-health can be hard to see.
• Proxy for nonworkers: The exposures experienced by tree planters can be useful in predicting larger population effects caused by increased wildfire effects (essentially the dangerous working conditions experienced by these workers create a natural experiment).
• Compliance: PPE slows tree planting work. Tree planters are generally paid on piece-rate basis. This pay structure basically forces tree planters to trade off their own health against their need to earn an adequate income and almost certainly reduces compliance. Contractors also have production targets, which means they too have an incentive to trade worker safety for profit.

A notable take-away from the article is the complete lack of a regulatory response to the risk posed by wildfire smoke. WorkSafeBC acknowledges the risk but can’t be arsed to issue any directives. Alberta’s OHS minister couldn’t even be bothered to respond to the reporter. This likely reflects regulatory capture of regulators by the forestry industry.

By contrast, Oregon and California require air quality monitoring and the availability of respirators when air quality gets to a specific point. This doesn’t mean these controls are adequate, but they are at least something.

-- Bob Barnetson

Another worker dies, nothing much happens.

Yesterday, CBC reported that three companies had been charged in a November 2021 workplace death. The worker was testing a pipe when a valve broke and killed the worker. Among the notable parts of the story is that the employer failed to conduct a hazard assessment and failed to identify a hazard.

The effectiveness of the OHS system rests on employers identifying hazards. When an employer fails to do this rudimentary task, the rest of the system doesn’t work because unidentified hazards can’t be controlled and workers die as a result.\

Unfortunately, Alberta employers often don’t bother to identify hazards. A 2018 survey of 2000 Alberta workers found only 50% of their employers had hazard assessments. And only 59% regularly provided information about hazard-control strategies for at least some of the hazards workers faced.

So, now that OHS has filed charges almost two years after the event, what is likely to happen in this case? The rest of the CBC article talks about other fatalities and gives you a pretty good idea.

The employers’ lawyer(s) will likely stall some. A year or two from now, one of the employers will plead guilty to a single charge and pay a relatively small fine ($100-300k). In the meantime, it will be business as usual.

If you think this sounds like a pretty ineffective approach to protecting workers, you’d be right. The same study found that roughly 1 in 5 Alberta workers reported injuries (of varying degrees) each year and 1 in 11 received a disabling injury (where they could not do some or all of their job the next day).

Underlying ineffective enforcement is basically a lack of political will to punish employers to maiming and killing workers. Indeed, the UCP substantially weakened OHS laws during its first term. Not surprisingly, the rate of worker injury has risen under the UCP’s watch.

-- Bob Barnetson

Hollywood strikes highlight undercurrent of violence in labour relations

Two strikes, one affecting writers and the other actors, have brought most Hollywood productions to a stand-still over the past two months. 

You can read a summary here but the gist is major studios are trying to cheapen work in order to gain a greater portion of the surplus value generated by labour.

The bosses’ strategy, at least with respect to the Writers Guild of America, appears to be simply starving out the workers. According to Vanity Fair, the bosses expect writers to run out of money by October and, once the workers are facing homelessness, they will resume negotiations and press for concessions. Starving workers until they give up is an age-old employer tactic.

Actor Ron Perlman, in a now deleted video, reacted to the bosses’ plan this way:

The motherfucker who said we’re gonna keep this thing going until people start losing their houses and apartments — listen to me motherfucker. 

There’s a lot of ways to lose your house. Some of it is financial. Some of it is karma. And some of it is just figuring out who the fuck said that — and we know who said that — and where he fucking lives.

There’s a lot of ways to lose your house. You wish that on people? You wish that families starve while you’re making 27 fucking million dollars a year for creating nothing? Be careful motherfucker. Be really careful. Because that’s the kinda shit that stirs shit up.

Perlman’s statement got quite a lot of media play because it is out of step with most people’s understanding of how contemporary strikes play out (basically people stop working and walk around with signs until the boss decides to negotiate). Suggesting that bosses might face violent, real-world consequences for trying to get even richer by economically destroying workers’ lives is pretty uncommon these days.

That hasn't always been true, though. Underlying every job action is the potential for violence. Often it has been used by bosses to bust a strike. But, occasionally, workers will destroy the bosses’ property or attack them directly. The post-war labour compromise in Canada has attenuated this risk, in part by strictly regulating strikes and strike behaviour.

But, when the bosses refuse to negotiate in good faith (or the system looks otherwise completely rigged against them), worker commitment to obeying labour law may fray because it is no longer in their interest to do so.

We most often see this dynamic play out in wildcat strikes. But worker frustration doesn’t have to be channelled in that direction. A worker or smnall group of workers could, as Perlman hints, just destroy a boss’s house or yacht or factory or mine or whatever.

It is worthwhile for both bosses and workers to pay attention to the potential for this kind of behaviour as they strategize how to bargain. Bosses who decide to play hardball, may be opening Pandora’s box. And worker may be overlooking a significant source of leverage by discounting alternatives to picketing.

-- Bob Barnetson

AU’s ergo program symptomatic of organizational dysfunction

Almost 100% of staff at Athabasca University (AU) work from home, at least part of the time. This is up from about 50% prior to COVID. The shift to permanent home offices was partially motivated by the cost savings associated with shifting operating costs (e.g., office space and equipment, utilities) onto workers.

The sudden move to working at home in March of 2020 due to COVID resulted in significant concerns among workers about both the financial and ergonomic implications of home work. Three years later, AU has launched new, online ergonomic training for staff.

Essentially, staff have been told to take online training and figure out how to adjust their home workplaces to be ergonomically adequate by April 30th. A key question is whether AU will fund any necessary purchases to make a home office ergonomically adequate? The answer is, of course, no.

Will there be additional funding to support any needs identified as a result of this assessment?
No. All home-office-based team members have been provided with Home Office Support Funding. This included $1,000 in 2020 and another $1,000 in 2022. Team members will be provided with an additional $800 Evergreening Fund every 6 years.

It was certainly appropriate for AU to respond to shifting operating costs onto workers in 2020 with a small, taxable payment (which might have bought a desk and chair and lamp). The taxable 2022 payment of $1000 (or $800) was negotiated in lieu of a wage increase so was essentially self-funding by workers.

In both cases, that money has already been spent by most workers. For this reason, it is not available to resolve any current ergonomic issues. (This reflects that AU rolled out the training and payment in the wrong order.)

Overall, this initiative is pretty typical of AU:

• A long-standing problem is addressed belatedly and inadequately.
• The workers are made responsible for solving the employer’s problem (i.e., unsafe workplaces).
• The employer gaslights the workers about it, in this case by referencing financial assistance that is only available if you have a time machine.

So what are AU workers likely going to do? Some staff will take the training, either because they are rule followers or because they are being explicitly paid to do so (e.g., tutors). I expect the rest of staff won’t bother to take it or will take it but not implement many of the recommended changes because it will require them to spend their own money to solve an institutional problem.

This program (which is, at least superficially, a good idea) is a microcosm of how AU operates. Essentially, the administration “talks away” problems instead of addressing them and staff learn to tune out or superficially comply. The result is widespread distrust of leaders and staff disengagement.

The aftermath of the 2022 staff engagement survey results (released two weeks ago) pretty much mirrors this. Staff disengagement has been identified as such an issue it was added to the institutional threat register at last week's Board of Governor's meeting. That doesn't mean anything is being done to fix it, though.

Senior executives are heavily messaging that the results are “sobering” but not actually doing anything about it. This is the performative “talking away” of problems that fixes nothing. Staff are, of course, onto this strategy, with only 30% believing senior leaders will do anything, because successive executives have talked away problems for years and years:



Middle managers seem to be taking two approaches to the results. Some are earnestly (I think) asking for staff feedback. This ask is basically flopping because of the long-standing “big bosses who cried wolf” dynamic to problems. For example, in my meeting of people who are basically lead hands, there was just dead silence in response to the ask for feedback. Others middle managers are framing the results as a consequence of inadequate communications.

It is true that gaslighting and victim blaming are communications strategies that are inadequate. But, since this approach has gone on for most of a decade and intensified over time, it is likely this is an intentional strategy, not some sort of oopsie. Last week’s framing of engagement by the HR director as “good” because it encourages staff to work harder is essentially an admission that the employer doesn’t care about staff except as the means to an end.

For staff, disengagement (whether active or passive) is a very sensible response to a traumatizing workplace. The other response I’m seeing is people over-engaging, which is leading to burn out. This is pretty hard to watch, but perhaps some people need to hit rock bottom before they’ll change their behaviour. I know that I did.

-- Bob Barnetson

How OHS sentences are determined

Many labour-side practitioners assert that the financial penalties levied against employers that violate occupational health and safety rules are so low that they do not serve as a deterrent to future violations by the same or a different employer (basically, they are just the cost of doing business). In some jurisdictions, employers can be subject to modest tickets or administrative penalties for violations. Where an employer has done something serious, they can also be subject to prosecution under OHS legislation. 

Pleading or being found guilty can result in fines being assessed by the court within whatever range is set in the legislation. Section 48 of the Alberta’s OHS Act, for example, sets the maximum penalty for a first-time violation at $500,000 (plus a 20% victim surcharge) and/or not more than six months of imprisonment. (In theory, employers can also be charged under the Westray provisions of the Criminal Code, but that basically never happens. Similarly, jail time for an OHS prosecution is almost never imposed.)

There were 11 (or maybe 12, see below) convictions in Alberta under the OHS Act in 2022:

• Precision Trenching Inc pled guilty to a 2018 trench collapse fatality and paid a fine of $275k.
• Insituforms Technology Inc pled guilty to a 2019 serious injury and paid a fine of $100k.
• Emcom Services Inc pled guilty to a 2019 serious injury and was fined $86k. (This conviction appears twice on the list, but I think that is an error).
• Amyotte’s Plumbing & Heating Ltd pled guilty to a 2019 fatality and was fined $170k.
• Joseph Ogden pled guilty to a 2019 fatality and was fined $80k.
• Trentwood Ltd pled guilty to a 2020 fatality and was fined $150k.
• The Town of Picture Butte pled guilty to a 2020 serious incident and was ordered to pay $87k in creative sentencing.
• Kikino Metis Settlement pled guilty to a 2020 serious incident and was ordered to pay $8.5k in creative sentencing.
• McCann’s Building Movers Ltd pled guilty to a 2020 fatality and was fine $320k.
• Polytubes 2009 Inc pled guilty to a 2020 serious injury and were ordered to pay $100k in creative sentencing.
• Cross Borders Consulting Ltd pled guilty to a 2020 fatality and was fined $324k.

This is a pretty typical year in terms of numbers and fines. Often employers face multiple charges and, as we saw in 2022, plead out to a single violation and fine.

A recent Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench sentencing decision following a workplace incident that left a worker paralyzed is helpful in understanding the factors used when the Court’s determine fine levels. The maximum fine available to the judge in Saskatchewan was $1.5 million. Paragraph 12 sets out the factors commonly used to assess penalties.

[10] R v Westfair Foods Ltd., 2005 SKPC 26, 263 Sask R 162 [Westfair Foods] is a seminal case in Saskatchewan for the sentencing of corporations for OHS violations causing injury. At paragraph 38, Whelan J. distilled the essential principles from the case law and academic works as follows:

i. The primary objective of regulatory offences is protection and in the context of occupational health and safety legislation, it is the protection in the workplace of the employee and the general public.

ii. The sentencing principle which best achieves this objective is deterrence and while deterrence may be regarded in its broadest sense and includes specific deterrence, general deterrence is a paramount consideration.

iii. There are numerous factors, which may be taken into account and the weight attributed to each will depend upon the circumstances of each case. The following is not an exhaustive list of factors that may be considered, but they are likely relevant to most occupational health and safety offences:

• the size of the business, including the number of employees, the number of physical locations, its organizational sophistication, and the extent of its activity in the industry or community;
• the scope of the economic activity in issue - the value or magnitude of the venture and any connection between profit and the illegal action;
• the gravity of the offence including the actual and potential harm to the employee and/or the public;
• the degree of risk and extent of the danger and its foreseeability;
• the maximum penalty prescribed by statute;
• the range of fines in the jurisdiction for similar offenders in similar circumstances;
• the ability to pay or potential impact of the fine on the employer's business;
• past diligence in complying with or surpassing industry standards;
• previous offences;
• the degree of fault (culpability) or negligence of the employer;
• the contributory negligence of another party;
• the number of breaches - were they isolated or continued over time;
• employer's response - reparations to victim or family - measures taken and expense incurred so as to prevent a re-occurrence or continued illegal activity, and;
• a prompt admission of responsibility and timely guilty plea.

This decision also helpfully discusses the law on sentencing when government amend legislation to raise fine levels. Paragraph 18 quotes the Nova Scotia Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyeck:

[25] … For Courts to give "the legislative intent its full effect" we cannot be bound to prior sentencing ranges that do not reflect the Legislature's view of the gravity of the offence and society's increased understanding of the severity of the harm arising from the offence (see paras. 108-109). An upward departure from prior precedents is appropriate to arrive at a proportionate sentence.

As set out in Paragraphs 24 and 25, the Saskatchewan judge fined King Stud $126k (effectively one year of net proceeds) to be paid of a time period to be determine later. The range of fines

[24] A total penalty (fine and surcharge) of roughly one year’s net proceeds to the principals of the corporation, with time given to pay, is a proper balancing of all of the factors in this case - including the fact that, other than its early guilty plea, virtually none of the Westfair Foods factors are in King Stud’s favour, and some of them (such as its compliance record before and after this incident) are strongly against it.

[25] Such a fine will be a very significant penalty to the principals of the corporation but should not be so debilitating as to cause the collapse of King Stud. Will it be extremely uncomfortable for them for several years? Undoubtedly; but not nearly so uncomfortable as the rest of Dawson Block’s life will be for him, as a result of their actions or inaction.

It’s hard to know if this fine will cause the employer (which had an appalling safety record before this entirely foreseeable injury) to alter its behaviour or serve as a deterrent to other employers. I’m pretty skeptical. These were bad actors who got busted after the fact for yet another fall protection violation.

An interesting part of the discussion was the court’s efforts to set the fine at a level that served as a deterrent but was not so high that the owners of the corporation just walked away from the corporation (and thus the fine goes unpaid). The impact of limited liability corporations to shield owner-operators from some or all of the consequences of the corporation’s actions is a recurring bugbear for enforcing employment laws.

Perhaps, rather than further raising fine maximums (which seems to have a modest impact on actual fine levels) and perhaps fine minimums, legislatures might consider piercing the corporate veil to hold directors personally liable for unpaid OHS fines?

-- Bob Barnetson

More on COVID and OHS

Back in September, I blogged about how Alberta’s OHS inspectors seemed unwilling to address uncontrolled aerosol hazards in a workplace. My suspicion was that they and public-sector employers were facing political pressure from the government to ignore the risk posed by COVID to workers.

In October, an Alberta court ruled that the Minister of Education’s direction to school boards banning mandatory masking was ultra vires (she would need to enact a regulation). A month later, the UCP cabinet passed a regulation banning masking mandates as well as barring schools from switching to online-only classes. 

At the time this regulation was passed, schools were seeing unprecedented levels of staff and student absenteeism due to illness (due to a combination of COVID, RSV, and influenza—all airborne illnesses). Barring masking and online classes removed two very effective ways employers can control the spread of these diseases and protect workers (and children) from serious (and potentially fatal) illness.

Yesterday, Premier Danielle Smith announced that MLAs are calling organizations that are in receipt of government funding and asking them to rescind mandatory vaccine mandates. (At this point, vaccination provides modest protection against contracting COVID but does a good job attenuating the consequences of getting COVID. This still makes vaccination a useful component of any hazard--control strategy.).

According to CBC, Smith said:

"For instance, the Arctic Winter Games wanted $1.2 million from us to support their effort and they were discriminating against the athletes, telling them they had to be vaccinated," Smith said at a news conference in Edmonton on Monday.

"So we asked them if they would reconsider their vaccination policy in the light of new evidence and they did."

There was no indication what “new evidence” was offered to this organization. And, while no formal policy linking receipt of funding to rescinding vaccine mandates appears to exist (yet), the implicit threat to current and future funding is pretty clear.

At this point, I think the data is clear that public-sector employers have been told to (and, in some cases, legally enjoined from) taking the steps necessary to control occupational diseases. The government is also likely interfering in the enforcement of OHS laws (although the evidence here is more anecdotal). Not surprisingly, the result is a high level of avoidable work-related illness:



The data in the table above understates COVID claims in the public-sector because teachers are, for the most part, outside of the ambit of workers’ compensation legislation in Alberta.

What can workers do? Well, worker can wear masks, although single-person masking is much less effective than group masking. Workers might also get together and agree to group masking in the absence of employer support.

Work-refusal are also an option. But, since OHS seems unwilling to engage with aerosol hazards, refusals are likely to only work if they are carried out by a group that is prepared to risk sanction for engaging in an illegal strike. I see no appetite for supporting this kind of job action in Alberta’s labour movement.

Finally, workers can remember that the UCP was happy to sacrifice their health and their lives (and the health and lives of their children) in order to cater to anti-vax voters and cast their ballot in the next election with that in mind.

-- Bob Barnetson

Alberta KB decision on government edicts prohibiting mandatory masking in workplaces

Recently, I blogged about how the UCP’s changes to joint health and safety committees has basically rendered them ineffective. I used the elimination of masking mandates at Athabasca University (and other PSEs) as an example of how the internal responsibility system and the external responsibility system were failing workers.

Of note was the direction given PSE institutions by the Minister of Advanced Education to drop masking requirements. My position was that the Minister did not have the authority to order institutions to not comply with the OHS Act (which obligates them to take all reasonably practicable steps to protect workers from occupational hazards, such as COVID).

Yesterday, a Court of King’s Bench decision dropped that is relevant. In it, the judge notes that the Minister of Education, who prohibited school boards from requiring mandatory masking, had overstepped her authority. The nub of it was that the Minister needed to issue such direction in the form of a regulation, rather than just make a statement. Absent a regulation, the Education Act empowers school boards to make their own policies.

Presumably, PSE boards of governors would be in the same situation as school boards since section 59 of the Post-Secondary Learning Act (which addresses the power of PSE boards) is very similar to the language in the Education Act. That is to say, boards are not enjoined from implementing mandatory masking (or vaccination) policies simply because the Minister of Advanced Education said so.

If cabinet enacts a regulation (under the Regulations Act) enjoining boards from implementing masking policies, we them to consider whether such a regulation trumps the requirement set out in section 3 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act that boards, as employers, must take all reasonably practicable steps to protect the health and safety of workers. This includes an obligation, under section 9 of the OHS Code to control hazards.

This is all mostly an academic matter for two reasons. 

First, COVID-related policies in Alberta PSEs seem to fall clearly into the “minimizer” camp and decisions about protections are simply left to individuals. Basically, there is no political will among campus administrators to protect workers or students from COVID. 

Individualizing OHS issues (e.g., “you can wear a mask if you like”) ignore that masking is most effective when it is uniformly adopted. This makes intuitive sense: if everyone masks, we have two layers of protection against aerosol transmission versus one layer under the current "wild west" policy approach. This approach also ignores that ventilation (something only an employer can address) can reduce transmission.

Second, as I wrote about in September, Alberta’s OHS officers seem unwilling to engage with the hazard of aerosol transmission. This seems like an enormous dereliction of duty given Alberta’s workplace COVID stats (the screen cap below is from October 28, 2022--note the sectoral distribution of COVID claims...). Clearly COVID is a serious workplace hazard in Alberta. The only sector that seems to still recognize that is health care.



-- Bob Barnetson

2020 national work-related fatality and injury stats

Sean Tucker and Anya Keefe from the University of Regina have released their annual report on workplace fatalities and injuries. This year’s report rolls up the 2020 data but also includes a section on COVID-related injuries and fatalities from 2020 and 2021.

The nub of the report is that, nationally in 2020:

• There were 924 accepted WCB claims for fatalities, with about two-thirds being caused by occupationally-related diseases.
• There were also 254,000 accepted claims for lost-time injuries.

Specific to Alberta in 2020:

• Among provinces, Alberta had the second highest five-year average injury fatality rate, although there was a slight decline noted in 2020’s injury fatality rate.
• Among provinces, Alberta had the third highest five-year average disease fatality rate, although there was an increase noted in 2020’s disease fatality rate.
• Among provinces, Alberta had one of the lowest five-year average lost-time claim rates, although there was a slight increase noted in 2020’s lost-time claim rate.

I have nicked the relevant graphs from the report:

Looking at COVID claims:

Alberta had the second highest number of COVID-related fatality claims accepted (31) in 2021.

• Alberta had the third highest level of COVID-related injury claims accepted (7846) on 2021. There were 4800 accepted in 2020.

Alberta seems to be performing markedly worse than BC (despite BC’s slightly higher population). That said, it is a bit hard to know what to make of COVID claims data at this point because they may be affected by WCB policies as much as anything else.

-- Bob Barnetson

Alternative-causation arguments effective at sowing doubt

One strategy that manufacturers and employers use to delay the regulation of and liability for harmful substances is to make alternative-causation arguments. Basically, they say that the apparent effects caused by a harmful substance or process are actually the result of something else.

The journal Population Health has an interesting article examining the efficacy of alternative causation arguments on individual uncertainty or false certainty about the risk associated with products.

The upshot is that individuals exposed to industry-generated alternative causation messaging (that downplay the risk of harm) were more likely than a control group to be uncertain or false certain about the harms of certain products. Individuals with lower levels of knowledge about the topic were more likely to be affected.

The suggests that the alternative causation strategy is an effective one. It is one aspect of a well-established playbook of techniques that manufacturers use to avoid or delay regulating hazardous materials.

-- Bob Barnetson

More data on underreporting of workplace injuries in Ontario

The Institute for Work and Health has released results of a new study that matches emergency room visit records with workers' compensation data. In theory, all work-related injuries requiring medical treatment should be reported to Ontario's WSIB to avoid employers transferring the cost of treating workplace injuries onto the public health-care system.

The study finds that 35% to 40% of ER visits for workplace injuries were not reported to the WSIB from 2004 to 2017. This is broadly consistent with other data on under-reporting, which finds 40% to 60% of work-related injuries are not reported. 

Of the cases reported by health care professionals, 15% are not followed by workers (who should file a worker report). Further, there was a big drop in reporting beginning in 2008.

This study further demonstrates that workers' compensation injury data underreports the true level of workplace injury, even in the case of serious injuries. This raises questions about the utility of this data to assess and guide injury-prevention work. It also suggests significant cost-shifting around injury from employers to other groups (e.g., taxpayers, workers, private health benefit providers). 

Finally, this study suggests a useful way to begin correcting for under-reporting. For example, workers' compensation board could begin more aggressively following up on medical reports that do not generate worker reports to ensure these injuries are captured.

-- Bob Barnetson

Alberta guts OHS rules

In late December, my colleagues Jason Foster, Susan Cake and Jared Matsunaga-Turnbull and I wrote about Alberta’s efforts to gut Alberta’s joint health and safety committee rules and undermine workers’ right to refuse unsafe work.

The short of it is that joint committee have fewer duties and fewer powers and are much more creatures of the employer. This will undoubtedly reduce their already limited effectiveness. While it was there, the government also eliminated the requirement for periodic inspections of the workplace, regular meetings of the committee, ongoing training for committee members, and most rights to see information about workplace safety.

The right to refuse dangerous work has also been watered down, with term dangerous work being dropped in favour of the weaker term “undue hazard”. An undue hazards is a hazard that poses a serious and immediate threat to the health and safety of a person. The use of the terms “serious” and “immediate threat” narrow the kinds of danger work that can be refused. Most chemical and biological hazards, for example, do not pose an immediate threat.

The bar on employers’ retaliating for refusals has also been weakened. Previously, the employer could not discriminate against a work for refusing unsafe work. That has been narrowed to a bar on disciplining a worker. Practically, what this means is that an employer can now do things like assign a refuser crappy work or crappy shifts (because that is not discipline) if they refuse unsafe work.

Overall, this is part of the UCP governments efforts to reduce the financial cost to employers of safe workplaces. The negative impact on workers (in terms of injuries and deaths) is simply waved away. About the only good news is that the UCP is likely headed for electoral oblivion in May of 2023 so these changes stand a good chance to being scraped.

-- Bob Barnetson

2019 workplace injuries and fatalities report

Sean Tucker and Anya Keefe from the University of Regina have released their annual roll up of Canadian workplace injuries and fatalities using 2019 data. Note that this data is for the pre-COVID period, although there is some preliminary 2020 COVID-claims data included in a separate section.

The nub of the story for Alberta in 2019 (again, pre-COVID) is:

• Alberta continues to have among the highest per capita injury-related occupational fatality rate, which jumped 9% in 2019 over the previous three-year average. 
• Alberta also has the highest absolute number of injury-related fatalities despite having only about 10% of Canada’s population. 
• Alberta has the third highest absolute number of disease-related fatalities. 
• Alberta’s lost-time claim rate also jumped 11% in 2019 when compared the previous three-year average (the biggest jump in Canada)

Oddly, Alberta just announced changes to its OHS legislation (effective December 1) to weaken its already ineffective injury- and fatality-prevention system. The Alberta data in graphical form is below.

Nationally, there were about 39 accepted COVID-related fatalities and 32,742 accepted COVID-related lost-time claims in 2020. Here is a provincial breakdown.


It is not possible to draw conclusions from this snapshot but tracking and explaining the differences (when you control for population and perhaps the timing of the waves) in accepted cases in BC, AB, ON and QC would be an interesting project.

-- Bob Barnetson

Alberta's 2019 injury data released

Alberta finally released its annual report on injuries and fatalities for 2019. Some of the key findings are that, from 2017 to 2019:

• Lost-time claim numbers and rates are up slightly,
• Modified work numbers and rates are down some, and
• Overall, the number of disabling injuries is up slightly (likely population growth related) while the rate is down slightly. 

Industry-related data was not super surprising. Ag and forestry is the most dangerous and saw large growth in injury rates (~24%). I suspect this reflects the implementation of mandatory WCB in agriculture.

Manufacturing, processing and packaging was another sector with relatively high injury rates. We should expect this number to spike in 2020 and 2021 given the COVID waves that swept through the meat-packing plants. We’ll likely also see something similar in the public sector (particularly education and health care). We may also see this in mining, given the oilsands camp outbreaks.

There has been a long-term increase in occupational fatality rates in Alberta.


This has included a long-term reduction in the proportion of fatalities caused by motor vehicles accidents (blue bar in chart below) and an increase in workplace incidents (orange bar).

Claims related to harassment and violence doubled from 2015 to 2019. This may reflect, in part, greater awareness and acceptance of these sorts of injuries as a result of changes to the OHS Act and Code made by the New Democrats.


One of the most compelling charts is buried at the end of the document and it tracks injury rates over 10 years. Combined with the fatality rates chart above, the biggest take-away is that not much has changed. 

This suggests that the injury-prevention strategies mandated by successive Alberta governments (which have emphasized education and voluntary compliance coupled with anemic enforcement) have not really moved the needle on worker injuries or workplace safety.

-- Bob Barnetson